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6

The Decline and Fall of Apartheid

In the course of the late 1970s and the 1980s the rigid Verwoerdian model developed during the heyday of apartheid began to break down. The National Party government experimented with a number of reforms designed to adjust apartheid to changing economic and social circum-stances, while still retaining a monopoly of political power. But the spiral of resistance and repression intensified. By the mid-1980s virtual civil war existed in many parts of the country, with the army occupying black townships and surrogate vigilante groups adding to the conflict. The state retained control with military power, detentions and increased repres-sion; but the vast majority of South Africa’s population was alienated from the state to an unprecedented degree. Meanwhile, international condemnation grew and economic sanctions began to bite. The impasse was broken only when the exiled ANC and PAC were unbanned in 1990 and the new State President, F.W. de Klerk, made a qualified commitment to meaningful change. Negotiations between the state and the newly unbanned movements, although accompanied by violent conflict and widespread suspicion of state intentions, finally led to the creation of a new democratic constitution, and the election of an ANC-led government in 1994. The collapse of apartheid and the avoidance of a prolonged racial bloodbath was one of the major success stories of the late twentieth century, although economic and social problems remained overwhelming in magnitude.

The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, Fifth Edition. Nigel Worden.© 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2012 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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132 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

‘Total strategy’

In the late 1970s a number of factors led to a change in the policy of the South African state (Moss 1980). First, highly capitalized manufacturing industry now dominated the economy, using complex technology and requiring semi-skilled permanent workers rather than unskilled migrant laborers. In these circumstances, segregation and apartheid, so crucial to the earlier development and growth of industry, were no longer appropri-ate to the needs of South African capitalism (Lipton 1988; Feinstein 2005: 188–93).

Economic change also affected the class base of support for the National Party. Afrikaner business interests were now fully integrated into the monopolistic structure of South African industry, while full-scale mecha-nization of white agriculture produced ‘check book farmers’ linked to busi-ness interests rather than struggling producers competing for a limited labor force with urban employers. The cross-class Afrikaner nationalist alliance of the 1940s and 1950s was fracturing: many English-speaking middle-class voters now supported the National Party, while Afrikaner workers and small-scale traders and farmers were marginalized. After Vorster’s resignation in 1978, following major government financial scan-dals, the new Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, introduced changes favoring business interests and widened the divisions in the traditional support base of the National Party. The split came with the formation of the right-wing Conservative Party under Andries Treurnicht in 1982, which drew many white working-class and blue-collar supporters away from the government (Gilioinee 2003: 606–7). In these circumstances, Botha was obliged to forge a new kind of strategy.

Thirdly, the labor and urban resistance of 1973–7 had caught the gov-ernment unprepared. It became apparent after Soweto that repression was not enough. Attempts were made to recapture the initiative through reform, particularly by encouraging the development of a black middle class and attempting to win over township residents from African nationalist or radical sympathies.

A final factor explaining the reforms was the unfavorable international response and the threat of sanctions in the aftermath of Soweto, as well as the change of governments in states bordering South Africa, from allied interests to potentially hostile opponents: Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, with a similar threat in Namibia as conflict grew between South African forces and guerrilla troops of the South-West African People’s

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 133

organization (SWAPo). In these circumstances the South African state needed to reassess its public image and its policy strategies.

The outcome was a series of developments between 1979 and 1984 which collectively formulated the policy known as ‘total strategy’. Some hint of reform had been given earlier. Prosecution for pass law offences had dropped in number after 1973 at the request of business organizations, including the Afrikaanse handelsinstituut, although the principle of African labor regulation remained intact (hindson 1987: 81). Funding for African education had also increased, although insufficiently to prevent student dissatisfaction in 1976. But ‘total strategy’ went much further. Its rationale was that South Africa was the target of a ‘total onslaught’ by revo-lutionaries from inside and outside the country, who could only be com-bated with a ‘total strategy’ that ‘combin[ed] effective security measures with reformist policies aimed at removing the grievances that revolutionar-ies could exploit’ (Swilling and Phillips 1989: 136). It also aimed to restruc-ture society in ways required by industry, thus combining the economic interests of business, the political interests of the Botha administration, and the security interests of the military and security forces: ‘an attempt to reconstitute the means of domination in terms favorable to the ruling groups’ (Swilling 1988: 5).

Formal links between the National Party and big business were estab-lished at the 1979 Carlton Conference in Johannesburg, where Botha pledged his government to support free enterprise and orderly reform. The discourse of free market enterprise was increasingly used by the state in place of overt racial domination, partly as a means of combating the per-ceived Marxist ‘onslaught’ but more importantly as a means of establishing ideological hegemony with business support (Greenberg 1987). It marked a major shift from the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the early Afrikaner nation-alist movement, and bore little relation to the intense intervention of the state in the political economy of South Africa.

Two government commission reports in 1979 proposed changes to favor stable business development. The Wiehahn report recommended that African rights to trade union membership and registration be recognized. This was done to try to prevent repetition of the wildcat strikes of the 1970s and to formalize, and so control, the labor movement. The riekert Commission advocated that white job reservation should be dismantled while influx control was still rigorously applied. In this way it maintained the division between permanent city residents and temporary outsiders. Employer demands for greater access to a permanent workforce were thus

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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134 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

met, although the principle of controlled African urbanization remained. The pass laws were not abolished until 1986, by which stage a combination of employer needs, the spiraling costs of the immense bureaucratic admin-istration and the belief that repeal would appease international criticism of apartheid persuaded the government finally to remove urban influx controls (Maylam 1990: 80).

The need for semi-skilled black labor was also reflected in the de Lange report on education, published in 1981 (Chisholm 1984). This called for compulsory primary education for all as well as black technical training at secondary and tertiary level. Although the recommendation of a single education authority for all races was rejected by the government, multira-cial private schools were permitted. In this, as in other aspects of ‘total strategy’ policy, the aim was to ‘intensify class differentials while reducing racial ones’ (hyslop 1988: 190). This policy was further seen in the removal of many ‘petty apartheid’ restrictions. Public amenities in large cities, such as hotels, restaurants and theatres, were no longer compulsorily segregated and many opened their doors to all – that is, all who could afford them.

Lack of political representation remained an obstacle to black accept-ance of such reform strategies. A second phase of ‘total strategy’ therefore proposed constitutional changes in an attempt to co-opt sections of the population previously excluded from government. The 1983 ‘tricameral’ constitution created separate parliamentary assemblies for white, colored and Indian Members of Parliament. Each house controlled its ‘own affairs’, such as education, health and community administration, but all other matters were still monopolized by the white house of Assembly, which retained the overall majority of seats, and the new office of State President, held by Botha, acquired wide-ranging powers.

The tricameral constitution was clearly a means of ‘sharing power without losing control’ (Murray 1987: 112). Consequently, it was boycotted by the vast majority of colored and Indian voters. Measures which the lesser houses did promote, such as the abolition of the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts, were already acceptable to the ‘total strategy’ policy and indicated the clear move away from the racial control of the 1950s. As with the desegregation of public amenities, they did little to challenge the exist-ing political and social order.

The tricameral constitution made no provision for African participa-tion. The principle remained that constitutional representation for Africans was confined to the homelands. however, recognition of the permanent status of some black township residents had been given in 1977 when

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 135

Vorster introduced Community Councils to administer township affairs under the aegis of white government officials. In 1982, Botha extended this system by the Black Local Authorities Act, which gave Community Councils greater powers of administration. Elected by local residents, councilors were responsible for township administration on budgets raised by local rents and levies. Coinciding with tricameralism, this scheme hoped to create a class of willing collaborators ‘in a rather crude effort to defuse black claims to national political power through the substitution of power at grassroots level’ (Murray 1987: 123). As with the tricameral elections, town-ship Community Councils had little popular appeal.

Attempts to bolster allegiance to these policies were accompanied by a conscious effort to upgrade townships for those with permanent residence rights. The Urban Foundation, founded with business capital but sup-ported by the state, backed programs to improve housing and other facili-ties. In both townships and the rural areas the army was often deployed in community schemes in a campaign to ‘win the hearts and minds of the people’ (the WhAM policy), although this had a limited effect once the security forces began to suppress opposition (see p. 141).

The role of the army was a further important component of ‘total strat-egy’. Botha, previously the Minister of Defence, gave an important role to the armed forces within policy making as part of security against the ‘total onslaught’. The State Security Council (SSC), established in 1972 as an advisory body to the Cabinet, now gained greater powers under the new Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, including that of control over intelligence and security work. By 1980 it was observed that ‘in many ways [the SSC] is already an alternative Cabinet’ (Murray 1987: 40).

In addition to the WhAM campaign to stem the ‘total onslaught’ within the country, Botha attempted to defuse opposition from potentially hostile countries in the wider southern African region. his hope of creating a ‘constellation of states’ linked to South Africa by trade was foiled by the organization of the frontline states against South African influence, but the security forces then mounted a campaign of deliberate destabilization. Direct military incursions accompanied indirect support of dissident armed movements such as rENAMo in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola, while raids were made on centers which the South African state claimed housed ANC guerrillas in Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Botswana. In Namibia, South African occupation continued and a bitter guerrilla war was fought with the nationalist SWAPo (Davies and o’Meara 1984). In 1984 the results of this policy met some success with the signing

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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136 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

of the Nkomati non-aggression accord with Mozambique, by which the Maputo government agreed to expel ANC guerrilla camps from its territory in return for the ending of South African support for rENAMo.

‘Total strategy’ was thus as much a reformulation of apartheid as a reform. Its purpose was to maintain white political hegemony while restructuring some aspects of the social and political order to counter the threat of revolutionary opposition. This was abundantly clear to many of the state’s opponents, who resisted ‘total strategy’ with renewed energy.

Resistance and repression

‘Total strategy’ was intended to defuse protest outbreaks of the kind that had occurred in the 1970s, and to bring economic and political stability to South Africa. It had precisely the opposite effect.

The economy failed to recover the growth rates it had shown in the 1960s and early 1970s. Despite a brief recuperation between 1978 and 1980, subsequent years saw a fall in the gold price, a balance of payments crisis, and dependence on loans from the International Monetary Fund and foreign bankers. Inflation and unemployment soared in 1982, and again in 1984. The standard of living of all South Africans fell: black poverty became even more acute than ever.

These circumstances did not favor a state campaign to ‘win hearts and minds’. The recession was accompanied by heightened opposition to ‘total strategy’ policies. Many of the Botha reforms produced consequences unin-tended by the state (Friedman 1986). For instance, the relaxation of pass controls led to an unprecedented move of Africans into the cities. This was particularly evident in Cape Town, where the ending of legislated prefer-ence for colored workers gave greater possibilities for African employment. Large squatter camps grew up on the outskirts of the city, particularly at Crossroads. At first, they were ruthlessly destroyed as the dwellings of ‘illegal’ incomers by the ironically named Department of Cooperation and Development. But by 1984 the government conceded the rights of squatters to stay in the region and plans were laid for the building of a large new township at Khayelitsha. The attempt to distinguish between permanent residents and temporary outsiders was collapsing here as in many other cities.

Another unintended development was the emergence of powerful trade unions. The proper recognition of African union negotiating mechanisms led to a massive growth in membership, particularly among migrant

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 137

workers hitherto excluded from union representation. Falling real wages and poor working conditions produced a number of strikes in the early 1980s. But action went further than local factory issues. In 1982, spurred by the death in detention of Neil Aggett, the Transvaal organizer of the Food and Canning Workers’ Union, many unions came together to organ-ize campaigns which represented broader political interests and protested against state policies. Thus in November 1984 a major stayaway was organized on the rand backed by union and community groups. Large-scale union affiliations were being formed with political allegiances. The largest was the Congress of South African Trade Unions (CoSATU), launched in 1985 and following a broadly Charterist position. The Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU) took a position more in tune with Black Consciousness lines, and in 1986 the United Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA) was established under the aegis of the more con-servative Inkatha movement. The point was that unions were now at the forefront of the political struggle. Although there were debates within the unions over the advisability of involvement in wider populist politics, and fears that worker issues might thus be submerged, coordinated action between the federated unions and student and community organizations took place with increasing frequency from the mid-1980s. Far from taming the labor movement, the Wiehahn reforms had politicized it (Webster 1988).

The context for this was heightened popular resistance and mobilization on a scale which exceeded even that of the 1950s and 1976–7, and which took new forms and goals. In 1980 colored school students in the western Cape boycotted classes to protest against the use of army servicemen as teachers, and to demand free education for everyone and not for whites alone. Links were made with striking meat workers in Cape Town. Boycott action spread to the rand and the eastern Cape, where it meshed with demands for the ending of homeland citizenship. Although the boycotts were broken by police action by the end of the year, these episodes provided a link between the uprising of 1976–7 and the more widespread resistance of the mid-1980s.

The catalyst to this was the tricameral constitution and the Black Local Authorities Act. Both measures made it absolutely clear that the Botha government was attempting to restructure apartheid rather than to dis-mantle it, and that the African majority would continue to be permanently excluded from central government. White control would be entrenched, but the state hoped that the new system would be more acceptable both

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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138 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

locally and internationally. New oppositional organizations emerged to demonstrate the fallacy of this belief.

Early in 1983, the National Forum (NF) was established, bringing together supporters of Black Consciousness in the Azanian People’s organization (AZAPo) and the non-collaborationist tradition of the western Cape Unity Movement. Its ‘Manifesto of the Azanian People’ opposed all alliances with ruling-class parties, demanded the immediate establishment of ‘a democratic, anti-racist worker republic in Azania’, and defined the struggle for national liberation as ‘directed against the system of racial capitalism which holds the people of Azania in bondage for the benefit of the small minority of white capitalists and their allies, the white workers and the reactionary sections of the black middle class’ (Davies et al. 1988: 454).

Such a policy was a rejection of the broader populist Charterist tradi-tion, which was represented in the foundation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the same year. The UDF called for rejection of the apart-heid state, boycott of the tricameral system and acceptance of the Freedom Charter principles (see p. 115). The campaign had dramatic results: only a small percentage of colored and Indian voters cast their poll, and many others refused even to register. The tricameral system was thus denied legitimacy from the start.

Both the NF and the UDF were loosely knit confederations of commu-nity, youth and trade union organizations that had proliferated across the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s, rather than political parties. Their differences lay in their ideologies, with the NF regarding worker interests as paramount and criticizing the UDF for its ‘petty bourgeois’ leadership and its populist multi-class character. The Black Consciousness strand in NF thinking was apparent in the reluctance of some of its supporters to admit white-dominated organizations such as the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). however, those from the Unity tradition rejected any policy that recognized race. Indeed, the involvement of AZAPo members in the NF showed how the Black Consciousness movement had moved decisively towards workerist positions since the days of Biko.

The UDF acquired by far the largest number of affiliates and the highest public profile, and was only really challenged by the NF in the western Cape. The UDF drew on a wide range of local community organizations across the country, and particularly in the Transvaal and the eastern Cape. Swilling (1988) has argued that its Charterist position did not preclude working-class membership, and indeed leadership. Certainly, as protest

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 139

developed in the course of 1984–6, the organizations affiliated to the UDF gave it an increasingly radical character, although it still lacked a clear political program and was ‘only involved in issues if the relevant affiliates sought its assistance’ (Seekings 2000: 291).

The UDF also worked more actively to recruit support to its affiliated organizations at a local level. Its campaign to obtain a million signatures for a petition against apartheid in the aftermath of the tricameral elections in 1984 failed to attain its numerical goal, partly because of police harass-ment and confiscation of signed papers, but ‘it did, for the first time, provide township activists with a vehicle for some solid door-to-door organizing’ (Swilling 1988: 101).

By 1985 this was bearing fruit in a series of local campaigns, including bus and rent boycotts, school protests and worker stayaways. Although local circumstances varied, a common focus of township resistance was the Community Councils and those councilors who accepted office and were branded as collaborators in the apartheid system. Economic pressures also undermined the position of the councils. Not only were they politically unacceptable, but their dependence on local funding and their role as col-lectors of rents and unpopular service charges made them vulnerable to protests against increases at a time of recession. Tensions were heightened by accusations of corruption and malpractice. Such issues mobilized town-ship residents of all ages and meshed with student protests and boycotts.

It was primarily resistance to increases in rent and service charges that led to a major rebellion in the townships of the Vaal triangle between September and November 1984 (Seekings 1988). Protest spread to other parts of the Transvaal, with attacks on councilors and their homes as well as government buildings, homes of police and beer halls. A number of councilors resigned under such threats to their lives, but the uprising con-tinued with student and worker protests at the fore. By 1985 township conflict had spread to the orange Free State, the eastern Cape and, finally, to Cape Town and Natal.

State repression only fuelled further opposition. on Sharpeville Day, 1985, police opened fire on a funeral procession in Uitenhage in the eastern Cape, killing twenty people in an episode that bore strong resemblance to the events twenty-five years earlier. This provoked renewed school boycotts throughout the country and clashes between township youth and police. By July the situation had reached such proportions that the government declared a State of Emergency in many regions, extending the power of arbitrary detention without trial and indemnifying the security forces

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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140 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

against any charge of malpractice. With a brief break in 1986, emergency regulations were extended throughout the country and remained in place until 1990.

The conflicts of 1984–6 marked a new phase in South African popular resistance. In many townships throughout the country civil government collapsed, to be replaced by alternative, unofficial organizations calling for ‘people’s power’. In many cases, as in 1976–7, the initiative was taken by youth organizations, although they drew support from a wider sector of the community than was the case previously. More effective links were made between students and workers, particularly in the Vaal triangle and in the eastern Cape. Street committees organized coordinated actions such as rent boycotts and consumer boycotts of white businesses to persuade their owners to support calls for desegregation and lessening of state oppression. Moreover, this happened in hitherto unpoliticized small towns and rural areas in platteland South Africa as much as in the large metro-politan townships. In many cases, such actions by young men were only reluctantly supported by their elders, who resented the overturning of generational authority. Certainly, the events of the mid-1980s marked an emergence into the political arena of a male youth assertiveness that had previously been expressed through gangs (Glaser 1998).

In most of these cases, local grievances led to action; during the Vaal uprising the UDF was ‘trailing behind the masses’ (Seekings 1992). It none-theless played an important part in creating an alternative national political culture that transcended local issues and gave a sense of common purpose. In this its Charterist line was crucial. In many townships the ideals of the Freedom Charter provided the focus for action and political organization. A case study of Youth Congress activists in the Alexandra township near Johannesburg shows that in practice this might not always have penetrated very deeply, although debates over populist and workerist issues and clashes with AZAPo supporters were part of the linking of local issues of rent and school boycotts with a wider national framework (Carter 1991).

A further important development was the massive increase in support for the exiled ANC, not only in its earlier regions of strength such as the eastern Cape and the Transvaal, but also in the western Cape where histori-cally its position had been weaker (Bundy 1987b). Songs of praise to Mandela and Tambo, study of ANC underground literature, ANC flags draped across coffins at the many funerals of activists killed by the security forces, and shouts of ‘Viva’ (the Lusophone rally cry used at ANC camps in Angola and Mozambique) gave visible signs of ANC resurgence within

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 141

the townships. In this the UDF played a crucial role, replacing the predomi-nantly Black Consciousness ideology of the mid-1970s and strengthening the charterist tradition (Seekings 2000: 292). Guerrilla infiltration by Umkhonto we Sizwe members also increased, with attacks on power sta-tions and even the military headquarters of the Defence Force in Pretoria. By 1985–6 a number of delegations of South African business, student, church and trade union leaders were visiting the ANC headquarters in Lusaka (Lodge 1988). The ANC was widely recognized as the South African government-in-exile.

By late 1985, the spiral of popular resistance and state repression had reached new heights. Violence in townships was directed not only against councilors but also against suspected informers by a younger generation than previous leaders (Bonnir 2000). In some areas youth operated ‘peo-ple’s courts’ to punish breakers of the consumer boycott, and in some widely publicized cases death sentences were carried out on state collabora-tors by necklacing, that is, placing burning tires around their necks. There was a widespread but mistaken belief that the state was about to collapse. hence the slogan among boycotting students of ‘liberation before educa-tion’ (Bundy 1987b). only at the end of 1985 did the National Education Crisis Committee, formed by parent, teacher and youth bodies, change this call to one of demand for alternative ‘People’s Education’ (hyslop 1988).

Despite such challenges to the state, it was clear by 1986 that revolution was not just around the corner. Local authorities could be overthrown, but central government was more powerful. The state hit back hard. The army was deployed in the townships alongside the police from october 1984, thousands of activists were detained, and organizations such as the UDF and AZAPo were banned. running street battles took place throughout 1985–6 in many townships, but stones and burning barricades were ultimately no match for heavily armed security forces. With the aid of Emergency powers, the army and police had crushed the rebellion by 1987.

In the process a high degree of militarization had taken place. Massive amounts of the state budget went on defense, most of it deployed internally. Conscripted whites fought a civil war in the townships, white schools were infused with security force propaganda and military training, and the State Security Council played an ever-increasing role in the formation of govern-ment policy (Evans and Phillips 1988). After 1986 the National Security Management System, headed by the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, set up a web of local administrative bodies under military and police command to act as ‘security controls’ (Morris and Padayachee 1988).

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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142 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

This did not go unopposed amongst white South Africans. The use of the military in civil action led to heightened objection by some conscripted national servicemen. The End Conscription Campaign (ECC), founded in 1983, gained wider support after the deployment of troops in townships, and although its impact was largely limited to a few liberal English speakers, it was sufficiently threatening to the state to be subject to harassment and final banning in 1988 (Nathan 1989).

The state not only intervened directly, it also encouraged reactionary vigilante action against township activists. Vigilantes emerged in 1985 to protect township councilors, police and traders, but widened their activities to include attacks on a number of anti-apartheid organization members, in both townships and the Bantustans. This was portrayed in the media as ‘black on black’ violence, but it is clear that vigilante groups received support from the police, for whom they were a convenient means of coun-tering protest. The attacks came from within communities, removing the stigma of aggression from the security forces but giving them a rationale for staying in the townships (haysom 1989).

A particularly dramatic example of vigilante action was that of the ‘Witdoeke’ (named after the white headbands with which they identified themselves), who appeared in Cape Town squatter camps. In May and June of 1986 they destroyed shacks at Crossroads and other camps, while police stood by and allegedly intervened to protect them from retaliatory action by residents. Although originating under the patronage of local councilors and self-appointed landlords, many vigilantes by the end of 1986 were formally incorporated into the security forces as ‘community guards’ and ‘kitskonstabel’ police auxiliaries (‘instant constables’).

Community conflicts sometimes reflected deeper tensions. In August 1985 violence erupted in Inanda, near Durban, which was depicted by the media as based on ethnic conflict between Indian shop and property owners and African tenants and squatters, thus evoking memories of the 1949 Durban riots (see p. 114). Certainly, ethnic division was highlighted by Inanda’s circumstances. An area of freehold property ownership since the nineteenth century, many Indians had established farms and businesses in Inanda, and some were landlords with predominantly African tenants. Increased population led to severe overcrowding and poverty by the 1980s. Tensions rose when Inanda was scheduled for incorporation into KwaZulu, with claims that rents were being increased (hughes 1987). But the conflict was also based on political competition. Vigilantes took action

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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against UDF-affiliated youth in Inanda, not in support of Indian property owners but as supporters of Inkatha.

Clashes between UDF groups and Inkatha grew in intensity from the mid-1980s. Inkatha was originally established in the 1920s as a Zulu ethnic movement to stem the greater radicalism of the ICU (see p. 91). revived by Buthelezi, the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland in 1975, it had grown by 1980 to be the largest African political organization in the country – although with so many others banned that was hardly a major achievement, and its membership was confined primarily to rural areas of KwaZulu.

Buthelezi trod an uneasy line. he refused independence for KwaZulu, thus seriously setting back the Bantustan strategy, initially presented himself as the internal wing of the ANC (which had supported the re-founding of Inkatha in 1975), and demanding the release of ANC leaders before con-sidering negotiation with the government. however, Buthelezi and Inkatha, rejected by Black Consciousness supporters as collaborators, and losing initiative to the ANC in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising, had by the early 1980s retreated into its Natal base. It also moved away from ANC positions by rejecting protest politics and international sanctions. For this Buthelezi won much support from liberal whites. The opposition Progressive Federal Party, for example, approved of his plans for a federal state struc-ture in which KwaZulu would play a major role. he also increasingly found favour with the government. But in doing so, he forfeited the conciliatory role that he had hoped to obtain amongst Africans throughout the country, and instead presented himself primarily as the defender of Zulu identity (Southall 1981).

Inkatha emphasized ‘the maintenance of patriarchal and hierarchical values’, which it presented as traditional aspects of Zulu political culture (McCaul 1988: 158–9). But it expanded its support outside traditional rural areas in the course of the 1980s, in response to the threat that the UDF posed to its authority. KwaZulu administrators and teachers were almost universally members, and the Inkatha Youth Brigade worked actively in KwaZulu schools. The appeal of Zulu ethnicity was used to attract workers both in Durban and on the rand to unions federated to UWUSA, estab-lished in 1986 as a rival to the UDF-oriented CoSATU.

By this time Inkatha’s split with the ANC-Charterist tradition was com-plete, and mutual recriminations between UDF and Inkatha took place. Certainly, the presence of Inkatha explained the low support that the UDF

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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obtained in many parts of rural Natal, although in squatter settlements and townships around Durban and Pietermaritzburg support for the rival organizations was more divided. By mid-1985 political tensions ran high, meshing with community conflicts in Inanda as well as in the Durban townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi. This was fuelled by the assassination of Victoria Mxenge, a prominent lawyer sympathetic to the UDF, and the subsequent call for a boycott and stayaway by CoSATU and UDF-affiliated youth organizations. Inkatha opposed such actions, which it regarded as a UDF-inspired recruiting drive in the contested territory of Natal town-ships, and Inkatha vigilante groups moved in.

The conflict in Natal grew in intensity when elsewhere it was suppressed. In 1987–8 civil war existed in the area around Pietermaritzburg. Long-standing rivalry between Inkatha and ANC/UDF supporters was certainly the cause of this, with attacks and counter-attacks in which the violence of Inkatha was often ignored or even encouraged by the police, while UDF activists were detained (Kentridge 1990). But the war also took place in one of the most impoverished regions of the country, and competition for scarce resources added to the problem. Complex local power and clientage relationships played a role; as Gwala (1989) has shown, some private African freeholders in areas around Pietermaritzburg resisted Inkatha to assert their independence from KwaZulu government control over their lands. Generational conflicts and the weakening of the more traditional patriarchal ties in some parts of Natal played a part in the Inkatha/UDF divide (Campbell 1992). The UDF–ANC ‘comrades’ were most often asso-ciated with new kinds of community mobilization in the townships and villages (Sitas 1992).

one thing about the Natal war was clear. It was not the ethnic clash of ‘Zulu’ versus ‘Xhosa’ as claimed by the state and the international media in its depiction of ‘black on black violence’. And increasingly, allegations of state support for Inkatha gave rise to suspicion that the government was actively encouraging vigilante action.

1987–1994: stalemate and breakthrough

The resistance of the mid-1980s destroyed utterly the ‘total strategy’ tactics of the Botha government. Tricameralism and African urban councils had been firmly rejected by the demand for ‘People’s Power’. The campaign to win hearts and minds was in tatters, with thousands in detention without prospect of trial and an occupying army in the townships.

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 145

It was not only the disenfranchised who rejected the government and its policies. By 1985 those business interests which had cautiously allied themselves with the reformist state in 1979 were now bitterly critical of it. A turning point came in August of that year, when expectations raised by Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, of an imminent announcement of mean-ingful reform to meet internal demands and stave off foreign sanctions were quashed by an angry and unrepentant P.W. Botha. his ‘rubicon address’, delivered in the full glare of massive international publicity, firmly rejected any notion of majority rule or response to foreign pressure.

The response was immediate. Loans granted by foreign banks in 1982 were now called in, with no facility for renewal. As a result the rand col-lapsed, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was temporarily closed. These events ‘spurred South African business leaders on to the offensive’ (Mann 1988: 80). Within a month leading business directors were visiting the ANC in Lusaka. International condemnation of South Africa grew even stronger in intensity, with the United States and most Commonwealth and European Community nations speeding up disinvestment and economic sanctions. only Thatcher’s refusal to follow this trend gave continued open-ings for South African trade and communication links.

other key props of the South African political economy were also col-lapsing by 1987. Although the resistance of the mid-1980s centered on townships, rural opposition also played an important part in defeating government policies. For instance in 1985–6, youth protested in the Sekhukhuneland region of Lebowa, where traditions of opposition to chiefs appointed by the government went back to the revolt of 1958 (see p. 111). Partially inspired by UDF organizers and by migrants with urban experi-ences, ‘comrade’ youth attacked local Bantustan officials, boycotted schools and set up ‘people’s courts’, which replaced chiefly authority. But such actions were also accompanied by more traditionalist local beliefs. Numerous accusations of witchcraft were made against those who were believed to be responsible for local misfortunes, and with the collapse of central authority, many such victims were burnt to death by the ‘comrades’ (Delius 1996). In KwaNdebele mass opposition led to a rejection of inde-pendence in 1986 (Transvaal rural Action Committee 1988). Together with the long-standing refusal of KwaZulu to take independence, this effectively brought a halt to the Bantustan strategy.

With the collapse of ‘total strategy’, the government seemed bankrupted of ideas, relying on internal repression and international bravado. In May 1986 a high-ranking Commonwealth delegation (a concession granted to

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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146 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

Thatcher by Commonwealth leaders) arrived in South Africa to investigate the situation and talk to the government. But while the delegation was still in the country, its visit was undermined by South African raids on sup-posed ANC bases in harare, Lusaka and Gaborone. International condem-nation rose to still greater heights, and even Thatcher was appalled.

By 1987 a stalemate existed. Writing in the following year, one academic described the situation as one ‘in which the inability of dissidents to over-throw the hegemony of the state is countered by the incapability of the state to eliminate dissidence completely’ (Frankel 1988: 280). The state had lost the initiative, but no one else had the power to seize it. The tricameral election of 1987 returned the Nationalists to the white house of Assembly, but with a right-wing Conservative Party opposition. The disaffection of white workers and farmers, squeezed by the slumping economy and falling real wage levels, was becoming a serious factor in this right-wing resur-gence. reform was certainly no longer on Botha’s cards. With the banning of many organizations, virtually the only legal voice of opposition came from the churches, especially from the new Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu.

The breaking of this stalemate came from an unexpected source. In August 1989, Botha was forced to step down on the demand of members of his Cabinet, following his public rebuke of the Transvaal leader of the National Party, F.W. de Klerk, for planning a visit to the ANC in Lusaka. De Klerk replaced him and led the government into a tricameral election, where it lost seats to both the Conservatives on the right and the Democratic Party to its left.

resistance to government had taken a new direction in the course of 1989. In contrast to the confrontation of youth and other activists in the streets of the townships, the leaders of the UDF and CoSATU, allied in what was known as the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), called for a campaign of mass civil disobedience to challenge segregated facilities such as hospitals, schools and beaches. Unlike the rather disparate defiance campaigns of the 1950s, the actions of 1989 were well coordinated. They were also successful in bringing about desegregation. Lodge and Nasson (1991: 110–11) suggest that this may have been because desegregation was already being planned by the government and such challenges were little threat to its authority. After de Klerk’s takeover, police attacks on defiance campaigners were markedly toned down. In September and october a number of peaceful marches were allowed to take place in the centre of the major cities, joined by many whites, in protest against the State of Emergency

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 147

and the powers of the security forces. No action was taken against the demonstrators. They did not seem greatly to threaten the state, although by the end of the year the initiative clearly lay with the MDM.

But in his opening address to Parliament on 2 February 1990, de Klerk made a dramatic move. he announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and South African Communist Party, and in the following weeks released many political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela. In 1991 key pieces of apartheid legislation were repealed, such as the Group Areas Act, the Land Act and the Population registration Act. And later that year, the govern-ment entered into formal negotiations with a range of parties, including the ANC, at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CoDESA), committing itself to a new constitution to give democratic rights in a single unitary state.

What had brought about this complete volte-face by the National Party government? Popular protest and international condemnation were cer-tainly part of the broad background. So was the profound economic crisis. Private capital and investment were flowing out of the country, the state was borrowing heavily and foreign sanctions were beginning to bite severely (Feinstein 2005: 148–9). As the Governor of the South African reserve Bank warned in May 1989,

if adequate progress is not made in the field of political and constitutional reform, South Africa’s relationships with the rest of the world are unlikely to improve . . . In that event South Africa will probably remain a capital-exporting and debt-repaying country for years . . . In such circumstances, the average standard of living in South Africa will at best rise only slowly. (Terreblanche and Nattrass 1990: 18)

Botha’s ‘reforms’ had been unable to overcome the effects of economic isolation. Moreover, the structural inequalities of apartheid were too glaring to be ignored and were detrimental to the whole economy. As elsewhere in the late 1980s, technological changes were making unskilled labor redun-dant. Most blacks, and increasing numbers of whites, were unemployed and unemployable. New capital investment was lacking. Prices were rising and real wages, for those who were earning them, were falling sharply. The relative national prosperity that accompanied apartheid in the 1960s had vanished for ever. historians have debated when this decline set in: some argue that even in the 1960s economic growth levels could have been higher and were held back by apartheid policies which limited local consumer

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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148 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

markets (Iliffe 1999: 98–9). Certainly, the effects of such structural prob-lems were visible from the 1970s. It had taken almost two decades for the state to recognize that political reform was a necessary precondition to any attempt at economic recovery. Without this, the continuing spiral of ever-worsening poverty, disaffection and repression was inevitable.

In these circumstances, the new State President and his Cabinet made a political gamble in order to break through the stalemate and regain the initiative. Threats from the growing Conservative Party in an all-white electorate needed to be pre-empted. De Klerk was apparently told by his security advisors in the course of 1989 that the ANC had been sufficiently weakened by attacks on its frontline bases and on its internal underground structures to be a controllable force if unbanned (Giliomee 1992: 33–4). It appeared that an alliance between a ‘new-look’ National Party, drawing in white voters from the left and centre of Parliament, and the conservative Inkatha Freedom Party, with its predominantly Zulu membership, could win over a significant percentage of the population and give the Nationalists a share, if not a monopoly, of power in a democratic, and hence interna-tionally supported, government.

This belief was bolstered by trends outside South Africa. It is now clear that the critical factor in de Klerk’s timing was the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The collapse of Communist states throughout eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union following the Gorbachev ‘revolution’ and the general discrediting of socialism that seemed to accompany it indicated that the ANC and its SACP allies might be weakened in South Africa as well, and that ‘free market’ ideology could triumph. Moreover, the end of the Cold War removed the threat of the ‘Communist onslaught’ that for so long had played a major part in ‘total strategy’ thinking. The demotion of the military in de Klerk’s cabinet marked a move away from such policies.

In 1989 democratic elections had been held in Namibia, from which South Africa had finally agreed to withdraw after its military vulnerability was exposed in Angola by Cuban, Angolan and SWAPo forces in the pre-ceding year. Although SWAPo won a majority, its support was by no means unanimous and the more conservative opposition won a much higher proportion of seats than had been the case in the Zimbabwean independ-ence elections of 1979. radical African nationalism seemed on the wane. De Klerk evidently hoped that he could regain legitimacy and play an important role in a majority government that would be more conservative than had seemed likely at any earlier stage. And in shifting away from

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 149

single-party rule to multi-party democracy, South Africa was part of a broader trend taking place in other parts of the continent (Etherington 1992).

Certainly, de Klerk’s actions did not represent a surrender on the part of National Party government. rather it was a bid to regain the initiative and de Klerk assumed that the National Party would continue to play a key role in government. Soon after Mandela’s release the ANC agreed to par-ticipate in negotiations with the state and to suspend the armed struggle. As a result, by March 1992 tangible benefits had been obtained for the government. Some economic sanctions were lifted, sports boycotts were removed with South Africa’s participation in the Barcelona olympic Games, and international political acceptance was achieved for the first time since the mid-1970s. The effect of this was demonstrated by a white referendum in which 69% of voters supported continuation of the reform process through negotiation. right-wing claims that de Klerk lacked white support were seen to be unfounded.

But there was little agreement about the form that a future political set-tlement should take. After the referendum victory de Klerk became more assertive, particularly when opinion polls suggested he was gaining colored, Indian and even some African support, whereas the ANC was having dif-ficulty transforming itself from a liberation movement into a political party. The National Party insisted on the protection of minority rights and the election of an interim government of national unity in which it would secure some power for at least a decade.

The ANC faced other difficulties. In 1990 Buthelezi had converted Inkatha to a political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), at which stage many anticipated an NP–IFP alliance, or possibly an electoral coalition. More significantly, violence between Inkatha supporters and the now legal-ized ANC and its allies increased in intensity in Natal, especially on the rand, and in other areas of the country. As in Natal during the late 1980s, this conflict was more nuanced than the ethnic battle depicted in the media. The increasing flow of migrants to the cities after the lifting of influx control created new social tensions and economic struggles in townships and in informal ‘squatter’ settlements which meshed with political rivalries (Sapire 1992). A particular cause of conflict on the rand was the tension between migrant hostel dwellers, many from Inkatha-dominated rural Natal, and local township residents. This tension was heightened by unem-ployment and fuelled by ethnic mobilization (Segal 1992). Accusations made by the ANC that a ‘third force’ was at work became credible when it

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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was revealed in 1991 that the government had provided Inkatha with financial backing and military training.

revelations of this kind increased suspicion and mistrust between the government and the ANC. By 1992 the ANC leadership was under growing criticism from its grassroots membership for talking to the enemy while killings continued in the townships. In June, ANC members attending a funeral in the Transvaal township of Boipatong were attacked by Inkatha members supported by the police. The ANC withdrew from negotiations in protest and demanded a full investigation into the causes of violence and a firm check on the activities of the police and security forces. In an attempt to deflect international and local criticism, de Klerk appointed a commis-sion led by Justice Goldstone to investigate the causes of violence. Its investigations and press revelations deeply implicated the state security forces. Such violence by the army and police against ANC supporters was a continuation of the deliberate government policy of elimination and destabilization of its opponents through Botha’s National Security Man-agement System (Ellis 1998).

Tensions increased in subsequent months as the ANC threatened mass action campaigns. A march of ANC supporters to the Ciskei homeland capital of Bisho led to shootings by Ciskei forces and revealed the complex-ity of conflict in rural as well as urban areas. But the problems facing the country were not only political. Caught up in the general world depression of the early 1990s and lacking the necessary boost of capital investment for which de Klerk had hoped, the economy continued to slump. Under these conditions the optimism created in 1990 quickly evaporated. Yet it was clear that the clock could not be turned back to the apartheid era. Neither the government nor the oppositional movements could gain from a long-term stalemate.

In these circumstances, ANC and government leaders maintained a degree of contact and in September 1992 they agreed in a record of Understanding to resume negotiations. In 1993 a new forum was established at Kempton Park. Both parties had recognized their strengths and limita-tions in the aftermath of CoDESA’s breakdown, and the National Party was quietly abandoning its insistence on minority electoral protection.

But such bilateral agreements alienated Buthelezi, who was further offended by the government’s abandonment of a close alliance after its covert military and financial support of Inkatha had been exposed. Buthelezi refused to attend Kempton Park and the IFP held out against a unitary constitutional system, demanding instead federal and ethnic particularism

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 151

in KwaZulu-Natal under a revamped Zulu monarchy. In this Inkatha found allies in the rulers of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei as well as in the right-wing Conservative Party. Together they formed the Concerned South Africans Group (CoSAG) and opposed ANC and NP agreements in the negotiations.

opposition also came from the PAC and AZAPo, who accused the ANC of being a bourgeois organization that was selling out the interests of the black working class. The PAC was implicated in attacks on whites in both rural and urban areas, made by the guerrilla Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA).

Soon after the convening of the Kempton Park negotiations, this fragile balance was seriously disrupted by the assassination of the popular SACP and Umkhonto we Sizwe leader, Chris hani, by a right-wing gunman. Angered by this, and frustrated by the lack of any meaningful change since 1990, youth protested throughout the country, bringing the specter of violent opposition into the centre of several cities. Many of them ignored Mandela’s appeal for calm and appeared to be either abandoning the ANC for the PAC, or demanding a more radical policy from ANC leaders. Extreme right-wing violence and the frustrations of an alienated black youth had reached a critical level. Time was rapidly running out, both for the government to achieve a settlement in which it could retain some control, and for the ANC to retain its grassroots support.

This new sense of urgency acted as a catalyst at Kempton Park. An elec-tion date was finally set for April 1994 and the National Party, alarmed at polls which showed a significant decrease in its support, conceded the appointment of a Transitional Executive Council to supervise the interven-ing period alongside the government, and also the election of a transitional government for five years without any minority or federal safeguards. As a result, Inkatha walked out of the negotiations and the Conservative Party and other right-wing movements also boycotted Kempton Park. Some right-wing extremists led by the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (AWB) (Afrikaner resistance Movement), which had been formed in 1973 under the fanatic Eugene Terreblanche, now threatened civil war if majority rule was implemented, although their actual power remained to be tested.

The other main players at Kempton Park nonetheless proceeded to draw up an interim constitution. For five years South Africa was to be ruled by a democratically elected Government of National Unity, consisting of all parties who won enough votes under a proportional representation system for a place in the 400-seat National Assembly. This represented a major

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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152 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

compromise by the ANC which expected to win an outright majority in polls, but which recognized the dangers of continued civil conflict, ‘an attempt to hold it all together and avoid a Bosnia’ as SACP leader Jeremy Cronin put it (Marais 2001: 87). Those parties obtaining over 5 % of the national vote were entitled to representation in the Cabinet, which was to be led by an executive President elected by the majority of members. Any party obtaining more than 80 seats was entitled to a Deputy President. Such a system seemed likely to secure a Deputy Presidency for de Klerk under Mandela’s Presidency, thus reconciling the interests of both key players. The right of veto in the Cabinet or National Assembly by minority parties was denied, but a permanent constitution was to be drawn up by the new gov-ernment supported by at least 66 % of its members. In a bid to assuage whites alarmed by talk of nationalization of land and industry, property rights were guaranteed. A Bill of rights guaranteed fundamental freedoms such as racial, gender and sexual orientation equality. Nine new provinces replaced the former system of provinces and homelands, each with its own legislature, although their powers were vague and their funding dependent on central government. This fell far short of a federal system, although it was to give opposition parties such as the IFP and the DA bases of regional power in Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Western Cape respectively in the subse-quent decades.

Some modification to this constitution was made in early 1994 in an attempt to draw in both the white right wing and Inkatha. Promise of a double ballot (one for central and one for provincial government) and the formation of an Afrikaner volksraad (although with no powers) led to a right-wing split and to a leading army general, Constand Viljoen, register-ing a political party, the Freedom Front (FF), to contest the election. Although the Conservative Party continued its boycott of the election, it was evident by this stage that many right-wing whites, by no means all of whom were Afrikaner nationalists, pragmatically realized that participation in the election offered their best hope, and that the AWB’s threats of a race war were unrealistic and counter-productive (hyslop 1996).

It was less easy to woo Buthelezi back into the fold. Violence in Natal continued unabated, and Inkatha refused to permit voter education or electioneering in KwaZulu. A State of Emergency was declared in Natal and the specter of continued civil war loomed large in the weeks before the election. Desperate mediation, both government and international, failed to persuade Buthelezi to participate until just one week before polling day. only then did he realize that the election was going to take place without

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 153

him. Moreover, it appears that attempts by the state and the ANC to weaken the link between him and the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, threatened his ability to stand out as the representative of a united Zulu separatism.

Inkatha’s final participation was also encouraged by the collapse of the other homeland members of CoSAG. South African citizenship had been restored to all homeland residents in order to enable them to vote in the election, and most homeland leaders had backed this. The way was led by the Transkei premier Bantu holomisa, who openly sided with the ANC. Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana and oupa Gqozo of the Ciskei still held out against reunification and the loss of their privileged positions. But the reality of the forthcoming loss of financial support from a democratic government in Pretoria led to civil servant and army strikes in both areas. In Bophuthatswana, Mangope was overthrown only a month before the election. A threatened AWB ‘invasion’ to support him failed ignominiously,

Map 6 South African provinces created in 1994

NORTHERN CAPE

NORTH-WEST

LIMPOPO

FREESTATE

EASTERNCAPE

WESTERNCAPE

MPUMALANGAGAUTENG

N

KWAZULU-NATAL

0 200 400 km

IndianOcean

AtlanticOcean

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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154 ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID

breaking the mystique of a right-wing military threat. Thus by polling day most of the key players had been incorporated into the election process.

The election campaign focused primarily on the personalities of the party leaders, particularly Mandela and de Klerk, both of whom were more popular than their respective parties. Both the ANC and the NP consciously sought to present a new image to the electorate. The ANC played down its role as a liberation movement and emphasized its careful plans for recon-struction and development in order to counteract accusations that its leaders were inexperienced in government. Although still broadly following the principles of the Freedom Charter, it also played down socialism and entertained free market ideas. The NP stressed de Klerk’s role as South Africa’s savior and the extent to which it had turned its back on apartheid. other parties made little impact in the campaign. The PAC was under-funded, disorganized and overshadowed by the ANC, whereas the DP found its role as a liberal opposition party increasingly irrelevant and its ideals taken over by the more prominent NP.

on polling days the violence predicted by the world media failed to materialize and was replaced by images of patient queues and euphoric voters as almost 20 million South Africans participated. Indeed, the elec-tion was a cathartic breaking point with South Africa’s past and worthy of Mandela’s description of it as a ‘small miracle’ by late twentieth-century standards. But the logistical difficulties of the election were formidable, particularly those caused by the last-minute participation of Inkatha. results were delayed and accusations of electoral malpractice abounded, especially in KwaZulu-Natal. The final results reflected a compromise between contesting parties over disputed cases.

But the results were recognized by all parties, not least because they reflected an ideal situation for a consensus government. The ANC won 62.6 % of the national vote, large enough to give it a convincing majority but just short of the 66 % required for it unilaterally to write a new constitu-tion. The NP scored 20.4 %, ensuring de Klerk his position as one of the Deputy Presidents alongside the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki, and the IFP obtained 10.5 %, giving Buthelezi a seat in the Cabinet as Minister of home Affairs. other parties fared less well. The Freedom Front obtained 2.2 %, enough for it to win nine seats in the National Assembly but failing to over-come the split within the white right wing, whereas the DP and PAC each obtained less than 2 % of the national vote. The only other party to obtain enough votes for seats in Parliament was a hastily formed fundamentalist Christian party.

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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ThE DECLINE AND FALL oF APArThEID 155

At regional level the ANC swept the board in six of the nine provinces and narrowly obtained control in the Northern Cape. But it lost KwaZulu-Natal to Inkatha and the Western Cape to the NP. The Natal result was highly contentious, but grudgingly accepted to prevent threats of continued violence. The Western Cape was the only province where Africans formed a minority: most voters supported the NP, including a large number of coloreds who were alarmed by the specter raised by the NP in the election campaign of ANC affirmative action for Africans in jobs and housing and to whom the ANC’s campaign strategies held little appeal (Eldridge and Seekings 1996). Indeed, it appears that most South Africans did vote on racial grounds, with the large majority of whites, coloreds and Indians backing the NP, DP or FF, and Africans supporting the ANC, IFP or PAC. While the balance of power between the parties at national level achieved the purpose of wide representation in government, this division of voter allegiance also reflected the deep divisions of South African society which were to continue to haunt the newly democratic nation.

Suggestions for further reading

Cobbett, W. and Cohen, r. 1988: Popular struggles in South Africa. London: James Currey.

Davenport, T.r.h. 1998: The transfer of power in South Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Cape Town: David Philip.

Frankel, P., Pines, N. and Swilling, M. 1988: State, resistance and change in South Africa. Johannesburg: Southern Books.

Lodge, T. and Nasson, B. 1991: All, here, and now: black politics in South Africa in the 1980s. New York: Ford Foundation; Cape Town: David Philip.

Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa : Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/insu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=822664.Created from insu-ebooks on 2020-10-27 21:32:22.

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Discussion Board-History

 Please review the two attached readings and video and answer the two questions. thank you.

After reviewing this week’s material, answer the following questions:

1. Briefly describe the “total strategy” that was implemented in the late 1970s/early 1980s.  Why do you think the implementation of “total strategy” led to an intensified fight against apartheid?

2. Like we saw in the Civil Rights Movement, the anti-apartheid movement relied on coalition building among various organizations and on the mobilization of the youth.  Why was it so important for there to be collaboration of different anti-apartheid groups and why was it imperative that youth be included in the fight against apartheid?  

  

Individual Self-Assessment Report

The textbook includes online assessments that will help you understand yourself as an individual, team player, and leader.  You are to take 3 of these assessments in .  Specifically, you are to write about the Core Five personality traits (required for everyone) and take 2 additional assessments out of the following:

Emotional Intelligence

Team development behaviors

Communicating supportively

Strategies for handling conflict

You will write a paper in which you will:

  1. Discuss the exact results (provide both the number/rating and category) of each assessment and what the results mean (interpret the results).  You should then discuss whether you believe these results accurately reflect you and explain why or why not.
  2. Analyze how these results (make sure to discuss all assessments) can lead to different strengths and weaknesses as a) an individual contributor in a company, b) as a team player, c) as a leader.  Make sure to discuss all of the assessments.
  3. Provide a plan of action on how you want to improve on the weaknesses or maintain your current traits and skills.

The goal of this paper is to truly help you understand yourself.  Do not cheat yourself of the value of this project by doing it last minute.  One of the biggest shortfalls of individuals in the workplace is a lack of self-awareness of who they are and what they bring to the tables as well as what they could work on improving.

Points will be deducted if I am unable to understand your paper because of grammar/typos/spelling mistakes.  If I cannot understand the paper at all, it will result in an F.  I strongly suggest that you either go to the writing center or have someone else read it and make sure the message/writing is clear and correct.

12 Step Reflection

 

Instructions

This is going to be a discussion where students can share their experience of participating in 12-step recovery meetings with each other.

Prompt:

This discussion is an opportunity for you to share and discuss your experience of attending 12-step recovery meetings. Please share the following:

  1. What was the process of searching for meetings/ selecting meetings to attend like? (This is something we will often be helping clients with or asking clients to do on their own)
  2. What was it like to participate in the meetings?
  3. After gaining first-hand knowledge of a 12-step recovery meetings in your community, what is your impression of mutual aid as a way of supporting recovery? What benefits do you find these meetings to have for the clients you work with? What concerns you?

Initial Post Prompt:

Your initial discussion board post should be between 200 – 300 words in length. Be sure to use APA style and format If you use in-text citations and references. You should also include a descriptive subject line in this initial post.

Week 3 Assignment: Minor Project

For this assignment, please select either a church or a school that has both strong online and face-2-face presence.
Research and write a 1000-1200 word paper comparing and contrasting (showing similarities and differences) on-site and on-line operations from a marketing-perspective.
Your paper should address the following questions:
Carefully identify the target market for online vs on-site consumers using the 4 segmentation strategies discussed in class. How are the 2 target markets different?
Compare and contrast the products/services offered by the church or school that meets the on-site and on-line segments. Pay specific attention to unique product/services available to either online or F2F consumers.
What additional products/services can the company provide to increase value to face2face vs online consumers?
Compare and contrast how the company of your choice promotes itself to each of the on-site or on-line segments. What explains the differences in the way the company is reaching online vs on-site consumers?
What can the organization do to reach its onsite consumers better (aka additional promotional activities)? What can it do to better communicate to online consumers?
Your paper should adhere to the following:
Include at least 7 additional academic (e.g., journal articles) and/or popular press (e.g., Business Week) resources and at least 1 full Bible verse, in addition to your text to support your conclusions.
Separate title page
Double-spacing, 12pt font
APA Formating (see http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/01/ for APA formatting information)
References page at end of document
Submit your assignment through the link provided above. Review the grading rubric in the “Grades and Progress” section of the main menu by locating the assignment and clicking View Rubric. 

discussion post

 

Assume that upon your graduation, you accepted a position with the States Attorneys office as a victim service coordinator. It is your job to assist victims of crime in completing their victim impact statements. In your new role, you have been asked to research the following questions to improve the process for all the parties who are involved in the process.

The victim of a crime has the right to address the court prior to the imposition of a sentence. This is known as a victim impact statement and occurs after a finding or plea of guilty and prior to sentencing.

Answer the following:

  • Do you think that victim impact statements influence a judge in the sentence that they will impose? Why or why not?
  • If you were the victim of a crime, what would be the top 3 things that you would want the judge to know about how the victimization impacted you?
  • Conduct research and locate either a case or an article that discusses victim impact statements. Discuss the case or article, and express your opinion as to whether you agree or not.

TaskbriefmakeupAccountingIPortfolioex1.docx

BCO 114 ACCOUNTING I Task brief & rubrics

Task

Portfolio of exercises 1:

· Individual task

· Time limit: 2 hours

· Please answer all the 3 questions below. Explain your calculations

· Income and changes in retained earnings

· Submit your assignment in an Excel document

culturalactvityinstructions-Copy.docx

read the TIME magazine article and view the film. Then answer the questions below. TIME article: http://time.com/5478382/roma-movie-mexican-history/ Accessible on Netflix: Roma1. What surprised you about the living situation/set-up of Cleo and the family she helped care for? How is it different than what you would see in the U.S.?2. How would you explain the contrasts and/or connections between the different socioeconomic statuses represented in the film? Do you see a connection with race and socioeconomic status?3. Review the article about domestic workersa. https://remezcla.com/features/film/latin-american-movies-domestic-workers/ b. https://www.rappler.com/entertainment/movies/223946-roma-casts-spotlight-latin-america-domestic-workers c. What are Latin American films lacking in how they portray domestic workers? Where do they get it wrong? How is Roma unique in this area? What is it missing? How would you evaluate Hollywood films in this area?4. The TIME article states, “the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated the country’s government, as it had done since its founding in 1929, using a combination of political patronage, repression and electoral fraud to maintain its hold on power.” What impact does that truth have on the citizens of Mexico? 5. What aspects of history presented in the article are important to understanding Mexico? 6. How do the issues presented in the “racial divide” section compare to those in the U.S.?7. How do the characters behave or think that compares or contrasts to that of the culture you identify with? Was anything said or done that you would not typically do or see in your culture?8. What are your “takeaways” from this assignment?

CRITERIA:

· For your report: This is NOT a summary. It’s a reflection and analysis. It’s more than saying, “I learned a lot about culture”. What did you learn? What does it mean? Why is the information presented important to the culture? What does it say about who they are, how they live, or what they value? Do you know anything about its origin or how long it has survived? What does it mean to you? What impact would it have if YOU practiced that tradition(s) or had that value(s)? NOTE: Don’t tell me superficial information. Tell me your ANALYSIS about the significance of what you learned and REFLECT on the impact it would have for those who partake and share the value of the celebratiosn/traditions.

· Length: If you are using Times New Roman 12 font, double spaced with 1 inch margins, the report should be a minimum of 1.5 pages of specifics of what you learned, what it means, why its important, what it says about the culture represented, and your analysis and reflection of what impact it has on you.

(5 points)

· Minimum of 1.5 pages double spaced (excluding heading listing event); 1 inch margins

· 12 point font; Times New Roman

(25 points)

· INTERACT: Show evidence you interacted, asked questions, dug deeper

· ANALYZE: What does it all mean? Why is it significant?

· REFLECT: What would it be like to have that value, tradition, etc.?

· COMPARE: How does it compare to your own traditions, values, etc.?

· Any information given is followed with an explanation of its importance, comparison, analysis or reflection

· Your paper should NOT be about surface information. Review video for details.

Professional Platform for Ethics and Leadership

The role of the health care professional includes being a moral agent or a person whose actions affect themselves and others at a moral level. It is important to have a personal ethic or moral framework in which you ground your practice and professional relationships. The purpose of this assignment is to explore and create a foundation for leadership and ethics in your professional practice.

DP_DM_Template2020.docx

12

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Version: October 2020

© Northcentral University, 2020Comment by Northcentral University: Ensure every section in the document meets the following requirements:☐ Use 12-point and Times New Roman font.☐ Write in the future tense when referencing the proposed study in the dissertation proposal. Write in the past tense when referencing the completed study in the dissertation manuscript.☐ Use economy of expression to present information as succinctly as possible without oversimplifying or losing the meaning.☐ Avoid personal opinions and claims. ☐ Support all claims in the document with recent, scholarly, peer-reviewed sources published within 5 years of when the dissertation will be completed, unless they are seminal sources or no other literature exists. For additional information and guidance relating to scholarly and peer-reviewed sources, click here. ☐ Avoid anthropomorphism (i.e., giving human qualities to inanimate objects) such as “The article claims…”, “The study found…,”, or “The research explored…”. ☐ Clearly and precisely define key words upon their first use only.

Title of the DissertationComment by Northcentral University: With the exception of articles and prepositions, the first letter of each word should be capitalized. The title should be two single spaces (one double space) from the top of the page. In 10-15 words, it should indicate the contents of the study. The title should be bold.The title page should include no page number, so please recheck pagination once the template cover page has been removed.

Dissertation XXXComment by Northcentral University: Insert either “Proposal” or “Manuscript.”.

Submitted to Northcentral University

School of XXXComment by Northcentral University: Indicate your school name here. Do not include the specialization.

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF XXXComment by Northcentral University: Insert your degree program in all capital letters (e.g., DOCTOR OF EDUCATION, DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION).

by

NAMEComment by Northcentral University: Insert your name in all capital letters (i.e., FIRST MIDDLE LAST).

La Jolla, California

Month YearComment by Northcentral University: Insert the current month and year. There should be no comma separating them.

AbstractComment by Northcentral University: The abstract should be included in the dissertation manuscript only. It should not be included in the dissertation proposal.The word Abstract should be centered, bolded, and begin on its own page.

Begin writing here…Comment by Northcentral University: The text should be left-justified (not indented) and double-spaced with no breaks.

Checklist:

☐ Briefly introduce the study topic, state the research problem, and describe who or what is impacted by this problem.

☐ Clearly articulate the study purpose and guiding theoretical or conceptual framework of the study.

☐ Provide details about the research methodology, participants, questions, design, procedures, and analysis.

☐ Clearly present the results in relation to the research questions.

☐ State the conclusions to include both the potential implications of the results on and the recommendations for future research and practice.

☐ Do not include citations and abbreviations or acronyms, except those noted as exceptions by the American Psychological Association (APA).

☐ Do not exceed 350 words. Strive for one page.

AcknowledgementsComment by Northcentral University: You may include an optional acknowledgements page in normal paragraph format in the dissertation manuscript. Do not include such a page in the dissertation proposal.The word Acknowledgements should be centered, bolded, and begin on its own page.

Begin writing here…